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Abstract
We consider a real-life problem faced by the Sabanc¬University Dormitory O¢ ce (SUDO).
Every year SUDO (i) allocates the dormitory beds among applicants and then (ii) determines
the roommates that will share each room. For the allocation part, we examine the allocation
rule that is currently used and we show that it does not satisfy Pareto e¢ ciency, strategy-
proofness and justied no envy. To eliminate these shortcomings, we introduce a modied
version of the well-known serial dictatorship rule. We then analyze the roommate assign-
ment rule that is currently used by SUDO. We determine that this rule also has serious
shortcomings such as producing unstable and Pareto ine¢ cient matchings. We then modify
the rule to eliminate these failures. Moreover, we introduce a new kind of roommate problem
in which each agent has three roommates. We then obtain some conditions which guarantee
the existence of a stable matching for this kind of roommate problem.
Keywords: Allocation problem, justied envy, roommate problem, stability
B·IR GERÇEK HAYAT DA¼GITIM PROBLEM·IN·IN ·INCELEMES·I
Mahmut Kemal ÖZBEK
Ekonomi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2007
Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Özgür KIBRIS
Özet
Sabanc¬Üniversitesi Yurt Osinin (SÜYO) kar¸s¬las¸t¬¼g¬bir gerçek hayat problemini in-
celedik. Her sene SÜYO (i) yurt yataklar¬n¬ bas¸vuranlar aras¬nda da¼g¬t¬yor ve (ii) her
bir oday¬paylas¸acak oda arkadas¸lar¬n¬belirliyor. Da¼g¬t¬m k¬sm¬için kullan¬lan kural¬ in-
celedik ve gösterdik ki bu kural Pareto verimlilik, strateji korunumluluk ve mazur göster-
ilemez öykünüm özelliklerini sa¼glam¬yor. Kural¬n bu eksikliklerini gidermek için, çok iyi
bilinen dizisel diktatörlük kural¬n¬de¼gi¸stirerek uygulad¬k. Daha sonra, SÜYO taraf¬ndan
oda arkadas¸¬k¬sm¬için kullan¬lan kural¬inceledik ve bu kural¬n ise karars¬z ve Pareto ver-
imsiz es¸les¸meler üretti¼gini tespit ettik. Bu eksiklikleri yok etmek için kuralda de¼gi¸siklikler
yapt¬k. Bunlardan bas¸ka, her bir ajan¬n üç tane oda arkadas¸¬oldu¼gu yeni bir tür oda arkadas¸¬
problemi ortaya koyduk. Ayr¬ca, bu yeni tür oda arkadas¸¬problemi için kararl¬es¸les¸melerin
varl¬¼g¬n¬sa¼glayacak çes¸itli kos¸ullar öne sürdük.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Da¼g¬t¬m problemi, mazur gösterilebilir öykünüm, oda arkadas¸¬
problemi, kararl¬l¬k
1 Introduction
In this work, we examine the following real-life problem. Each year, Sabanc¬University
Dormitory O¢ ce (hereafter, SUDO) allocates dormitory rooms among students according to
their assigned priorities and preferences. SUDO uses a procedure for this allocation problem.
This allocation procedure has three stages. The rst stage is the selection of the students
that will get a bed and determination of which type of bed they will get. The second stage
is the formation of the roommates among the students who got a bed of the same type in
the rst stage. And the third stage is the assignment of the students to the rooms by using
the roommates information from the second stage.
However, when we analyze an outcome of this procedure for some problem, we observe
that it can be unfair and ine¢ cient. In this work, our objective is to propose an alternative
procedure which solves the unfair issues and improves the ine¢ cient results of the SUDO
procedure.
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, the literature on allocation
theory. Second, the literature on matching theory, built on a seminal paper by Gale and
Shapley (1962). Our contribution is three-fold. First, we present an application of theoretical
results in these areas. Second, we extend existing models and results in allocation theory to
allow constraints due to gender di¤erences. Third, we widen current models and results in
matching theory by allowing number of roommates to be more than two.
There are two types of rooms in Sabanc¬Universitys (hereafter, SU) dormitories: the
rooms with two beds and the rooms with four beds (which also di¤er with respect to cost and
space). Every student has preferences over these di¤erent kinds of rooms. Besides this, the
students want to stay in a room with their friends. Thus the students have also preferences
over potential roommates.
Every year, the number of students who want a room exceeds the total number of beds
at dormitories (see Table 1). Therefore, a subset of the students has to be selected. For
this purpose, each student is ordered with respect to previously dened priorities and each
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one of them is asked to declare his or her preferred room type: 2-bedroom or 4-bedroom.
Prior to this, the students are already in two separate groups with respect to their gender.
These gender groups are formed because SUDO forbids the students of opposite sexes being
assigned to the same room. Then SUDO uses a student selection rule that determines which
students will get a bed and which type of bed those selected students will get based on these
assigned priorities, submitted preferences and gender information.
Analyzing the SUDO student selection rule, we see that it can produce unfairsolutions.
Precisely, there may be a student whose ranking is high but who does not get a bed. At
the same time, there may be another student of the same gender whose ranking is lower but
who gets a bed. This situation is called same gender justied envy (hereafter, sg-justied
envy). In a closely related problem (school choice problem) Abdulkadiro¼glu and Sönmez
(2003) dened this situation, where the students are not necessarily having the same gender,
as justied envy. In a solution not having sg-justied envy, there should be no unmatched
student-room pair (i; r) where student i prefers room r to not being assigned a bed and i
has higher priority than some other student j of the same gender who is assigned a bed in
room r. This problem arises since the SUDO rule only considers studentsrst choice of
room type.
In the literature, this rst stage of the problem is widely discussed for allocation of
dormitory rooms (or on-campus housing facilities) to students (Hylland and Zeckhauser
(1979)). The following rule, which is known as the serial dictatorship, is almost exclusively
used in real-life applications of these problems (Abdulkadiro¼glu and Sönmez (1998, 1999)):
First order students according to some priority. Then assign the rst student his rst choice,
the next student his top choice among the remaining slots, and so on. This rule is not only
Pareto e¢ cient, but also strategy-proof (that is, it can not be manipulated by students who
misrepresent their preferences), and it can accommodate any hierarchy of seniorities. It also
eliminates sg-justied envy.
A major concern of the institution that implements a dormitory room assignment proce-
dure might be to represent a certain balance between students of di¤erent genders. For the
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school choice problem, Abdulkadiro¼glu and Sönmez (2003) discuss a similar issue for racial
concerns and dene the situation where there are quotas for di¤erent types of students as
controlled choice. We call this version of the room assignment problem as a controlled student
selection problem. An important advantage of the serial dictatorship rule is that it can be
easily modied to accommodate controlled student selection constraints by imposing gender
quotas. Furthermore, the modied rule is still strategy-proof and constrained e¢ cient. Also,
it still eliminates sg-justied envy.
After selecting the students and determining which type of beds they will get, SUDO uses
an algorithm to assign each type of selected students to their actual rooms. While doing this,
SUDO considers studentspriority orders and previously dened room orders. In addition
to these criteria, SUDO also considers the studentsdesire of being assigned to a room with
their friends. For this purpose, every student is asked to declare the list of his or her desired
roommates. The outcome of this algorithm consists of separate groups of students. We call
such an outcome a matching.
The problem with the SUDO roommate algorithm is that it can produce unstable match-
ings. A group of 4 (or 2) students block a matching if as roommates they all prefer the
group members to their existing roommates. A matching is stable if it can not be blocked1.
Another shortcoming of the SUDO algorithm is that its matching can be Pareto domi-
nated. In other words, a re-formation of the groups can be benecial for all students.
In the literature, the problem of forming groups among 2-bedroom type male students
or among 2-bedroom type female students is known as the roommate problem (Gale and
Shapley (1962)). A roommate problem involves a set of even cardinality n; each member of
which ranks all the others in order of preference. Therefore, a stable matching is a partition
of this single set into n=2 pairs so that no two unmatched members both prefer each other
to their partners under the matching. However, the roommate problem need not to have a
stable solution.
1A central issue in the matching theory literature is to nd a stable matching. However, many problems
do not have a stable solution. See Alkan (1986), Gale and Shapley (1962), Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for
cases where stable matchings fail to exist.
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Some further exploration of the roommate problem are considered by Granot (1984),
Guseld (1988), and Irving (1986). Irving (1986) observes, among other things, that the
task of nding stable matchings in the roommate problem is a generalization of the same
task in the marriage problem2. He proposes an e¢ cient algorithm which detects whether
a roommate problem has a stable matching and nds one if there is any. Moreover, Tan
(1991) proposes a necessary and su¢ cient condition which guarantees a stable matching for
a roommate problem when the agents possess strict preferences.
Chung (2000) points to the restriction on agents preferences in a marriage problem
which makes the problem a special case of the roommate problem. He then asks whether
there are other restrictions which provide the roommate problem to have a stable solution.
He proposes a su¢ cient condition called no odd rings for a roommate problem to have
a stable solution even when the preferences are not strict. Besides, he gives economically
more intuitive conditions which implies the no odd rings condition such as agents having
dichotomous preferences. He also shows that the Roth-Vande Vate (1990) process (which
is originally proposed for the marriage problem to nd a stable matching by starting from a
random matching and satisfying each blocking pair whenever there is one) can be used for
the roommate problem to nd a stable matching whenever the no odd rings condition holds.
However, the problem of forming groups among 4-bedroom type male students or among
4-bedroom type female students is di¤erent from the classical roommate problem dened
above. Now the problem involves a set of cardinality n which is divisible by 4 and a solution
to this problem is a partition of this single set into n=4 separate subsets. Therefore, every
subset consists of 4 students and these students are now called roommates. We again call
an outcome of this problem a matching. Here again the central issue is to nd a stable
matching for this problem. The results for the classical roommate problem can be adopted
to this kind of problem while searching for a stable matching.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we dene the student
2A marriage problem is that of matching n men and n women, each of whom has ranked the members of
the opposite sex in order of preference (Gale and Shapley (1962)).
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selection problem. In Subsection 2.1 we analyze SUDOs rule. In Subsection 2.2 we modify
the SUDO rule by using the results in the literature. In Subsection 2.3 we analyze the problem
under quota restrictions. In Section 3, we dene the roommate problem for 2-bedroom type
and 4-bedroom type students. In Subsection 3.1 we examine SUDOs rule for 2-bedroom
type students and evaluate the rule by the results in the literature. In Subsection 3.2 we
examine SUDOs rule for 4-bedroom type students and propose some results considering the
existence of a stable matching. Section 4 concludes with a list of open questions.
2 Student Selection Problem
In the student selection problem, there are a number of students, each of whom want to be
assigned a bed at one of a number of dormitories. Each dormitory has a maximum number
of beds and the number of students exceeds the total number of beds in dormitories. In SU,
there are two types of dormitories which di¤er by their roomsbed capacities. One type of
dormitory (hereafter, type 2 dormitory) has rooms all of which have 2 beds (hereafter, type2
room) and the other type (hereafter, type 4 dormitory) has rooms all of which have 4 beds
(hereafter, type4 room). These di¤erent types of rooms also di¤er with respect to cost and
space.
Each student has strict preferences over di¤erent types of rooms. Despite the fact that the
rooms of the same type may di¤er by many features (such as being at di¤erent dormitories),
in this stage of the problem each student is assumed to be indi¤erent between the rooms
of the same type. The reason behind this assumption is that the students are not assigned
their specic rooms in this stage; only a subset of the students is selected and which type of
room these selected students will get is determined.
A strict ordering is constructed according to previously dened priorities by SUDO. Here,
priorities do not represent the SUDOs preferences but they are imposed by the SUDOs rigid
rules. For example, a senior student is given priority for the rooms. Similarly, a student
who has a dormitory scholarship is given priority. These priorities will be explained in detail
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in the next subsection. Since every student is treated equally except their priorities, this
unique strict ordering of students is used by all the rooms during the selection process.
Formally, the student selection problem is dened as follows: The nite set of students
who want a bed at one of the dormitories is N . The set of all male students is M , and the
set of all female students is F . Hence N = M [ F . For simplicity, we treat the union of
type 2 dormitories as one dormitory and denote it as D2 and similarly denote the union of
type 4 dormitories as D4. Therefore, dormitory D2 is the set of type2 rooms and dormitory
D4 is the set of type4 rooms. A typical room of D2 is denoted by r2 and a typical room of
D4 is denoted by r4.
There are three types of beds: First, a bed b is a b2 type if it is in D2. Second, a bed is a
b4 type if it is in D4. And third, a bed is a ? type if it is neither in D2 nor in D4. The set
of these types is denoted by X, that is X = fb2; b4;?g. There is an excess demand for beds
in SU. Therefore, let D = D2 [D4 as the set of all rooms and B = fb 2 rj8r 2 Dg as the
set of all beds, then jBj = 2jD2j + 4jD4j < jN j. An indicator function T , which is dened
as T : B ! fb2; b4g, gives the type of a bed in B.
There is an asymmetric and negatively transitive binary relation onN denoted by  which
is determined from previously dened priorities by SUDO. We call this relation priority
ordering. For the negation of , we will use ~. Asymmetry requires that for each i and j
in N , ij implies j~i and negative transitivity requires that for each i; j; k 2 N; i~j and j~k
implies i~k. Also  is assumed to be weakly connected. Weakly connectedness requires that
for each i; j 2 N; either i = j or ij or ji. Each student is order in the priority ordering
is denoted by i. For example, for the rst student i 2 N , i = 1 and for the last student
j 2 N , j = jN j. A gender function g dened as g : N ! fm; fg indicates the gender of a
student in such a way: If a student i is male then, g maps i to m, but if i is female it maps
i to f .
Each student i is assumed to have an asymmetric, negatively transitive and weakly
connected preference relation Pi on X. Hence, is preferences might be of the form
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b2Pib
4Pi? indicating that is rst choice, which is denoted by P 1i ; is to be assigned a b2 type
bed, his second choice, which is denoted by P 2i ; is to be assigned a b
4 type bed, and his third
choice, which is denoted by P 3i , is to be assigned an ? type bed. Note that, by the denition
of N , there can not be any student i 2 N where P 1i = ?. We will use ~Pi for the negation of
Pi.
The set of all preference relations on X is P. A vector consisting of every students
preference relations is called a preference prole and is denoted by P = (P1; :::; PjN j). P i
denotes a vector of preference relations of students other than i. Hence, P = (Pi; P i) is a
preference prole. Similarly, for any coalition C  N , PC = (Pi)i2C and P C = (Pi)i2NnC .
The set of all preference proles is denoted by PN .
The student selection problem is a vector consisting of the set of students, the set of
rooms, the priority ordering, and a preference prole: (N;D; ; P ). However, since in our
model only P can be di¤erent between any two di¤erent student selection problems, with
abuse of notation we will use P also for a student selection problem. By the same
reasoning, the set of all student selection problems is denoted by PN .
The outcome of the student selection problem is an assignment of students to the bed
types and we call each such outcome a selection3. Therefore, a selection  is a vector in
XN . The student is assigned bed type under  is i.
Every selection decomposes N into three disjoint sets as follows: N2 is the set of students
who will get a b2 type bed (that is, N2 = fi 2 N ji = b2g), N4 is the set of students who will
get a b4 type bed (that is, N4 = fi 2 N ji = b4g), and N? is the set of students who will get
neither a b2 type bed nor a b4 type bed (that is, N? = fi 2 N ji = ?g). The union of the
sets N2 and N4 is denoted by N s and it refers to the set of selected students determined
by this selection. These two sets, N2 and N4 are also decomposed into two separate sets
due to gender respectively. These four sets are as follows: M2 = fi 2 N2jg(i) = mg,
F 2 = fi 2 N2jg(i) = fg, M4 = fi 2 N4jg(i) = mg and F 4 = fi 2 N4jg(i) = fg.
3Indeed, a selection is a matching between students and bed types where each bed type can be matched
to more than one student, but each student can only be matched to one bed type.
7
A selection  is a student selection for a student selection problem when the following
SUDO conditions are satised:
1. jM2j+ jF 2j  2jD2j and when this is an equality, both jM2j and jF 2j are divisible by
2
2. jM4j+ jF 4j  4jD4j and when this is an equality, both jM4j and jF 4j are divisible by
4
The set of all student selections for a student selection problem is denoted by . A
student selection  2  is Pareto e¢ cient if there does not exist any 0 2  such that for
each i 2 N; i ~Pi0i and there exits at least one i 2 N where 0iPii.
A student selection rule (hereafter, SSR) S is a systematic procedure that produces a
student selection for each student selection problem. That is, S : PN ! . An SSR S
is Pareto e¢ cient if for each P 2 PN , S(P ) is Pareto e¢ cient. An SSR S is strategy-
proof if for each i 2 N and for each P 2 PN , there does not exist any P 0i 2 P such that
Si(P 0i ; P i)PiSi(Pi; P i). An SSR S is coalitional strategy-proof if for any C  N , for any
P = (PC ; P C) 2 PN and for any P 0 = (P 0C ; P C) 2 PN , there exists an i 2 C such that
Si(P )PiSi(P 0). An SSR S eliminates same gender justied envy (hereafter, sg-justied envy)
if for each P 2 PN and for each i 2 N , fj 2 N j[Sj(P )PiSi(P )]^[j > i]^[g(j) = g(i)]g = ;.
An SSR S eliminates opposite gender justied envy (hereafter, og-justied envy) if for each
P 2 PNand for each i 2 N , fj 2 N j[Sj(P )PiSi(P )]^ [j > i]^ [g(j) 6= g(i)]g = ;. An SSR
eliminates justied envy if it eliminates both sg-justied envy and og-justied envy.
Since it is not possible to assign each student his top choice, a central issue in the
student selection problem is the design of a goodrule. We now rst describe and analyze
the student selection rule used by SUDO.
2.1 SUDO Student Selection Rule (SUDO-SSR)
Prior to 2005, SUDO o¢ cers manually selected the students who would get a bed. After
2005, to be more objective and to speed up the process, SUDO started to use the following
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mechanism for the rst stage of the room assignment procedure.
SUDO-SSR works as follows:
1. Each student submits a choice of room type.
2. A priority ordering is determined according to the following criteria:
 First priority: Having a dormitory scholarship
 Second priority: Coming from out of the city and being a senior student
 Third priority: Coming from out of the city and being a junior student
 Fourth priority: Coming from out of the city
 Fifth priority: Being a senior student
 Sixth priority: Being a junior student
 Seventh priority: Coming from the European part of the city
 Eight priority: Coming from the Anatolian part of the city (far)
 Ninth priority: Coming from the Anatolian part of the city (nearby)
3. Students in the same priority group are ordered based on the following hierarchy:
 First priority: University entrance ranking
 Second priority: Birth date (being young is better)
 Third priority: University ID number (having a smaller number is better)
Item 2 and 3 determine a unique  for the students.
4. The nal phase is the selection of students based on priorities, preferences and gender:
Associate a counter to each dormitory as follows: c2 and c4 keep track of how many beds
are still available in D2 and D4 respectively. Initially c2 = 2jD2j, and c4 = 4jD4j. Also, put
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four gender-bed counters as follows: c2m and c
4
m count respectively how many b
2 and b4 type
of beds will be assigned to male students. c2f and c
4
f count respectively how many b
2 and b4
type of beds will be assigned to female students. Initially, all gender-bed counters are equal
to zero.
Step 1: Start with student i in N with i = 1 in the priority ordering and assign i to
the corresponding bed type according to is submitted choice. Depending on is choice, the
associated dormitory counter is reduced by one. Depending on is choice and gender, the
associated gender-bed counter is incremented by one. The other counter stays put.
In general at
Step k: Consider student i in N with i = k.
Case 1 [is submitted choice is b2 and 0  c2  1 and c2g(i) is divisible by 2]: Assign i to
?. All the counters remain the same.
Case 2 [is submitted choice is b4 and 0  c4  3 and c4g(i) is divisible by 4]: Assign i to
?. All the counters remain the same.
Case 3 [Otherwise]: Assign i to the corresponding bed type according to is choice.
Depending on is choice, the associated dormitory counter is reduced one. Depending on
is choice and gender, the associated gender-bed counter is incremented by one. The other
counter stays put.
The algorithm terminates when c2 = c4 = 0. All the remaining students are assigned to
?.
Note that, the SUDO-SSR algorithm only uses the top bed type choice of the students.
The major di¢ culty with the SUDO-SSR is that it may not eliminate sg-justied envy
as the following example suggests:
Example 1 There are 8 students of the same gender, N = fi1; :::; i8g and there are two
rooms r2 and r4 consisting of 2 and 4 beds respectively. The priority ordering for each
ik 2 N is such that ik = k. The preferences are as follows:
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i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8
b2 b2 b2 b4 b4 b4 b4 b2
b4 b4 b4 b2 b2 b2 b2 b4
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
For these priorities and preferences, SUDO-SSR produces the student selection  which
assigns students i1, i2 to b2, students i4,i5; i6; i7 to b4, and students i3; i8 to ?. However,
i3 < i for any i 2 fj 2 N jj = b4g and b4Pi3?.
Here, after assigning i1, i2 to b2, SUDO-SSR considers i3s rst choice. But since r2
is now full, it can not assign i3 to b2. However, instead of considering i3s second choice,
SUDO-SSR directly assigns i3 to ? which is i3s third choice.
Since there is a threat of not getting a bed in SU dormitories even for the high ranked
students when they reveal their true preferences, students may misrepresent unilaterally
their preferences to benet from this selection mechanism. Because of this, SUDO-SSR is
not strategy-proof. In the above example, student i3 is assigned to P 3i3 = ?. He may instead
declare his preference relation as b4Pi3b
2Pi3? and will be assigned to P 2i3 = b
4 instead of
P 3i3 = ?.
Another di¢ culty with the SUDO-SSR concerns e¢ ciency. If students submit their true
preferences, then the outcome of the SUDO-SSR is Pareto e¢ cient. But since many students
are likely to misrepresent their preferences, its outcome is unlikely to be Pareto e¢ cient. The
following example illustrates this situation:
Example 2 There are 8 students of the same gender, N = fi1; :::; i8g and there are two
rooms r2 and r4 consisting of 2 and 4 beds respectively. The priority ordering for each
ik 2 N is such that ik = k. The preferences are as follows:
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i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8
b2 b4 b2 b4 b4 b4 b4 b2
b4 b2 b4 b2 b2 b2 b2 b4
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
For these priorities and preferences, SUDO-SSR produces the student selection  which
assigns students i1, i3 to b2, students i2; i4,i5; i6 to b4, and students i7; i8 to ?. But i3 may
believe that i2s preferences is such that b2Pi2b
4Pi2?. If this was the case, then SUDO-SSR
would produce the student selection 0 which assigns students i1, i2 to b2, students i4,i5; i6;i7
to b4, students i3; i8 to ?. By the threat of not getting a bed in SU dormitories, i3 may
change his true preferences in such a way: b4P 0i3b
2P 0i3?.
For these preferences, SUDO-SSR will produce the student selection 00 which assigns
students i1, i8 to b2, students i2; i3; i4,i5 to b4, students i6; i7 to ?. However, at the same
time i6 may believe that i3s preferences is such that b4Pi3b
2Pi3? (indeed it is a true belief
when i3 misrepresents as above). Therefore, by the threat of not getting a bed, i6 may
change his true preferences in such a way: b2Pi6b
4Pi6?.
For these preferences, SUDO-SSR produces the student selection 000 which assigns stu-
dents i1, i6 to b2, students i2; i3; i4,i5 to b4,and students i7; i8 to ?. However, now this
situation occurs: 000i6Pi3
000
i3
and 000i3Pi6
000
i6
.
2.2 Gender Sensitive Serial Dictatorship Rule (GS-SDR)
In the previous section, we see that SUDOs rule has serious shortcomings. The fact that
SUDO-SSR does not use full preference information causes these failures. If we consider the
studentsfull preferences, then these problems may disappear. For this purpose, we could
use a modied Step k of the SUDO-SSR as follows:
Step k: Consider the student i in N with i = k and consider P 1i .
Case 1 [P 1i = b
2 and 0  c2  1 and c2g(i) is divisible by 2]: Consider P 2i :
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Case 2 [P 1i = b
4 and 0  c4  3 and c4g(i) is divisible by 4]: Consider P 2i :
Otherwise, assign i to the corresponding bed type according to P 1i . Depending on P
1
i ,
the associated dormitory counter is reduced one. Depending on P 1i and g(i), the associated
gender-bed counter is incremented by one. The other counter stays put.
Case 3 [P 2i = b
2 and 0  c2  1 and c2g(i) is divisible by 2] : Assign i to ?. All the
counters remain the same.
Case 4 [P 2i = b
4 and 0  c4  3 and c4g(i) is divisible by 4]: Assign i to ?. All the counters
remain the same.
Otherwise, assign i to the corresponding bed type according to P 2i . Depending on P
2
i ,
the associated dormitory counter is reduced one. Depending on P 2i and g(i), the associated
gender-bed counter is incremented by one. The other counter stays put.
The algorithm terminates when c2 = c4 = 0. All the remaining students are assigned to
?.
GS-SDR annihilates the failures of SUDO-SSR as the following propositions state:
Proposition 3 For every student selection problem P , GS-SDR eliminates sg-justied envy.
Proof. Suppose that there exits sg-justied envy in an outcome  of GS-SDR for a student
selection problem P . Then, there must be a student i 2 N where fj 2 N j[jPii] ^ [j >
i] ^ [g(j) = g(i)]g 6= ;. Consider a student j in this set. Since 8k 2 N , P 1k 6= ? and
k = P
3
k ) P 3k = ?, and since for i and j; jPii, then it must be the case that j 6= ?.
Since j > i, at step i, it must be the case that either c2  1 or c4  1 according to j. But
then since g(j) = g(i), i must be assigned to j at step 
i. This is the required contradiction.
Remark 4 GS-SDR may not eliminate og-justied envy in some situations. However, this
is caused by the SUDOs requirement which states that students with di¤erent genders can
not be assigned to the same room. The following example illustrates this situation:
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Example 5 There are 8 students, N = fi1; :::; i8g and there are two rooms r2 and r4 consist-
ing of 2 and 4 beds respectively. The priority ordering for each ik 2 N is such that ik = k.
i1; i4; i8 are female and the others are male students. The preferences are as follows:
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8
b2 b4 b2 b4 b4 b4 b4 b2
b4 b2 b4 b2 b2 b2 b2 b4
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
For these priorities, preferences and gender information, GS-SDR produces the student
selection  which assigns students i1, i4 to b2, students i2; i3; i5; i6 to b4, and students i7; i8 to
?. Here, i3 = b4 and i4 = b2. However, 
i3 < i4 and i4Pi3i3. Hence, there is og-justied
envy in this selection.
In fact, there can not be any rule which eliminates og-justied envy when GS-SDR can
not do so.
Next we analyze the strategic properties of GS-SDR.
Proposition 6 GS-SDR is strategy-proof.
Proof. Consider a student selection problem P and a student i 2 N . We want to show that
revealing his true preferences Pi is at least as good for i as declaring any other preferences
P 0i 2 P. Construct a new problem P 0 by letting P 0 = (P 0i ; P i). Since the priority order
does not change, the students are considered at the same steps in both of these problems.
Moreover, any student j with i > j is assigned to the same bed type in both P and P 0
since j has the same preferences in both problems, that is P 0j = Pj.
At step i, if student i is assigned to P 1i , then he will not have an incentive to misrepresent
his preferences. Therefore, assume that in P he is assigned to P ki where k 6= 1. Since GS-
SDR rst considers P 1i , at step 
i, it must be the case that P 1i bed type is not available for
i. If in P , i is assigned to P 3i ; then by the same reason P
2
i bed type is also not available for
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i. However, changing the order of bed types in his preferences will not change this situation
for him. Therefore, he can not get a much preferred bed type in P 0.
GS-SDR is coalitional strategy-proof since SUDO does not allow the students to exchange
their rooms. However, if room exchange is permitted, then GS-SDR will not be coalitional
strategy-proof as the following example suggests:
Example 7 There are 8 students of the same gender, N = fi1; :::; i8g and there are two
rooms r2 and r4 consisting of 2 and 4 beds respectively. The priority ordering for each
ik 2 N is such that ik = k. The preferences are as follows:
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8
b2 b4 b2 b4 b4 b4 b4 b2
b4 b2 ? b2 b2 b2 b2 b4
? ? b4 ? ? ? ? ?
For these priorities and preferences, GS-SDR produces the student selection  which
assigns students i1, i3 to b2, students i2; i4,i5; i6 to b4, and students i7; i8 to ?. There, i2
and i7 may form a coalition and misrepresent their preferences as follows: b2Pi2b
4Pi2? and
b2Pi7b
4Pi7?. But then, GS-SDR produces the student selection 0 which assigns students i1,
i2 to b2, students i4,i5; i6; i7 to b4, and students i3; i8 to ?. After they are assigned to their
actual rooms, i2 and i7 can exchange their rooms.
We had noted that the SUDO-SSR is not e¢ cient. Next, we will explore e¢ ciency
properties of GS-SDR.
Proposition 8 GS-SDR is Pareto e¢ cient.
The intuition for the Pareto e¢ ciency of the GS-SDR is very simple. By the rule GS-
SDR, the rst student in the priority ordering gets his best bed type. Therefore, he can
not be made better-o¤. Then the second student gets his best type among the remaining
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ones. Therefore, he can not also be made better-o¤ unless the rst one is made worse-o¤.
Continuing in this way, we will reach the result that no one can be made better-o¤ without
hurting someone. But di¤erent from this approach, we prove the proposition in the Appendix
by contradiction.
2.3 Controlled Student Selection
Controlled student selection attempts to select students to determine which ones will get a
bed while maintaining the gender balance at dormitories. Prior to 2006, controlled selection
constraints were implemented by imposing gender quotas at SU dormitories. SUDO was
determining some rooms available only for the female students and the others available only
for the male ones. This type of controlled selection constraint is perfectly rigid. For such
a situation, there is no need to modify serial dictatorship rule. For each gender, one can
separately implement the rule in order to allocate the beds that are reserved exclusively for
that gender.
However, controlled selection constraints may be exible. For example, consider 100 beds
and assume that SUDO determines the average enrollment rates of male students versus
female ones as 45%, 55% respectively, and allows these rates to go above or below up to 5
percent points. Gender quotas for this student selection problem are 50 for male students,
and 60 for female ones. Serial dictatorship can be easily modied to accommodate controlled
selection constraints by imposing type-specic quotas.
2.3.1 Serial Dictatorship Rule with Type-Specic Quotas over Rooms (SDR-
TSQR)
If these type-specic quotas are imposed separately for each type of rooms, then the following
rule could be used: Consider D2 with q2 rooms and which has quotas of qm2 , q
f
2 for male,
female students respectively. Clearly q2  qm2 , q2  qf2 and qm2 + qf2  q2. In D2:
 q2   qm2 rooms are reserved exclusively for male students,
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 q2   qf2 rooms are reserved exclusively for female students,
 and the remaining qm2 + qf2   q2 rooms are reserved for either type of students.
Similarly consider D4 with q4 rooms and which has quotas of qm4 , q
f
4 for male, female
students respectively. Clearly q4  qm4 , q4  qf4 and qm4 + qf4  q4. In D4:
 q4   qm4 rooms are reserved exclusively for male students,
 q4   qf4 rooms are reserved exclusively for female students,
 and the remaining qm4 + qf4   q4 rooms are reserved for either type of students.
So it is as if there are three di¤erent dormitories dm; df ; and db where
 dormitory dm has (q2   qm2 ) type2 and (q4   qm4 ) type4 rooms and student priorities
are obtained from the original priorities by removing the female students and making
them unacceptable at dormitory dm. For this smaller problem, we could use serial
dictatorship rule and determine a student selection.
 dormitory df has (q2   qf2 ) type2 and (q4   qf4 ) type4 rooms and student priorities
are obtained from the original priorities by removing the male students and making
them unacceptable at dormitory df . For this smaller problem, we could use serial
dictatorship rule and determine a student selection.
 dormitory db has (qm2 + qf2   q2) type2 and (qm4 + qf4   q4) type4 rooms and those
students who are not selected in above problems are acceptable at dormitory db. Their
priorities are obtained from the original priorities by removing the students who are
selected already in the above problems. For this smaller problem, we could use GS-SDR
and determine a student selection.
Corollary 9 SDR-TSQR is strategy-proof and it eliminates sg-justied envy.
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Proof. Since both SDR and GS-SDR are strategy-proof rules, then every outcome of SDR-
TSQR is strategy-proof. And since both SDR and GS-SDR eliminate sg-justied envy, then
SDR-TSQR also eliminates sg-justied envy.
However, there can be e¢ ciency losses in the outcome of SDR-TSQR due to the controlled
selection constraints. The following example illustrates this point:
Example 10 There are 8 students, N = fi1; :::; i8g and there are three rooms r21 and r22 both
consisting of 2 beds and r4 consisting of 4 beds. The priority ordering for each ik 2 N is
such that ik = k. The students i1; i2; i5; i6 are female and the other students are male. The
quotas are such that qm2 = 0 and q
f
4 = 0. The preferences are as follows:
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8
b4 b4 b2 b2 b4 b4 b2 b2
b2 b2 b4 b4 b2 b2 b4 b4
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Under these quotas and for these priorities, preferences and gender information, SDR-
TSQR produces a student selection which assigns students i1; i2; i5; i6 to b2 and assigns
students i3; i4; i7; i8 to b4. However, students i1; i2; i5; i6 all prefer b4 to b2. At the same time,
students i3; i4; i7; i8 all prefer b2 to b4. Therefore, there is an e¢ ciency loss.
A student selection is constrained e¢ cient if there is no other selection that satises the
controlled selection constraints, and which assigns all students to a weakly better bed type
and at least one student to a strictly better one. Every outcome of SDR-TSQR is constrained
e¢ cient.
Proposition 11 SDR-TSQR is constrained e¢ cient.
Proof. Since SDR is Pareto e¢ cient, any student who gets a bed in dm or df cannot be
made better o¤ without hurting someone who gets a bed in dm or in df . And also since
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GS-SDR is Pareto e¢ cient as SDR, any student who gets a bed in db cannot be made better
o¤ without hurting someone who gets a bed in one of these three dormitories. Therefore
SDR-TSQR is constrained e¢ cient.
2.3.2 Serial Dictatorship Rule with Type-Specic Quotas over Beds (SDR-
TSQB)
In a more general setting, these type-specic quotas could be imposed for the total number
of beds. For example, there could be in total q beds and those beds collectively have quotas
of qm, qf for male and female students respectively. Clearly q  qm, q  qf and qm+ qf  q.
Then for such a situation a modied version of the GS-SDR can be used as follows:
In addition to dormitory counters c2; c4 and gender-bed counters c2m; c
4
m; c
2
f ; c
4
f , associate
a counter for each type of students equal to their quota. That is, cm = qm and cf = qf .
Step 1: Start with the student i in N with i = 1 in the priority ordering and assign i
to the corresponding bed type according to P 1i . Depending on P
1
i , the associated dormitory
counter is reduced by one. Depending on g(i), the associated type-specic counter is reduced
by one. Depending on P 1i and g(i), the associated gender-bed counter is incremented by one.
The other counters stay put.
In general at
Step k: Consider the student i in N with i = k and consider P 1i .
Case 1 [cg(i) = 0]: Assign i to ?. All the counters remain the same.
Case 2 [P 1i = b
2 and 0  c2  1 and c2g(i) is divisible by 2 and cg(i) 6= 0]: Consider P 2i :
Case 3 [P 1i = b
4 and 0  c4  3 and c4g(i) is divisible by 4 and cg(i) 6= 0]: Consider P 2i :
Otherwise, assign i to the corresponding bed type according to P 1i . Depending on P
1
i , the
associated dormitory counter is reduced one. Depending on g(i), the associated type-specic
counter is reduced by one. Depending on P 1i and g(i), the associated gender-bed counter is
incremented by one. The other counter stays put.
Case 4 [P 2i = ?]: Assign i to ?. All the counters remain the same.
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Case 5 [P 2i = b
2 and 0  c2  1 and c2g(i) is divisible by 2 and cg(i) 6= 0]: Assign i to ?.
All the counters remain the same.
Case 6 [P 2i = b
4 and 0  c4  3 and c4g(i) is divisible by 4 and cg(i) 6= 0]: Assign i to ?.
All the counters remain the same.
Otherwise, assign i to the corresponding bed type according to P 2i . Depending on P
2
i , the
associated dormitory counter is reduced one. Depending on g(i), the associated type-specic
counter is reduced by one. Depending on P 2i and g(i), the associated gender-bed counter is
incremented by one. The other counter stays put.
The algorithm terminates when c2 = c4 = 0. All the remaining students are assigned to
?.
SDR-TSQB and SDR-TSQR are two closely related rules. First of all, they are both
modied versions of SDR. Also, they coincide on a subclass of problems as the following
proposition implies. Therefore, some properties of SDR-TSQR can also be acquired by
SDR-TSQB.
Proposition 12 SDR-TSQR produces the same student selection as SDR-TSQB for a con-
trolled student selection problem where the type-specic quotas over rooms are determined by
the outcome of SDR-TSQB for the same problem with the type specic quotas over beds.
Proof. After realizing the student selection for a problem with type-specic quotas over
beds by using SDR-TSQB, the problem becomes a controlled student selection problem with
perfectly rigid quotas over beds. These perfectly rigid quotas over beds can be transformed
to perfectly rigid quotas over rooms for this problem. Then both SDR-TSQR and SDR-
TSQB just become the serial dictatorship rule. The only di¤erence with the applications
of these rules is that for SDR-TSQR, di¤erent types of students are exclusively assigned to
bed types, however, for SDR-TSQB they are assigned to bed types in the same process. But
since the students priorities and preferences are same in these two applications, then their
outcomes will be the same.
Now we use this relationship for the following corollary.
20
Corollary 13 SDR-TSQB is strategy-proof and constrained e¢ cient. It also eliminates sg-
justied envy.
Proof. As it is stated in the above proposition, by using SDR-TSQR for the corresponding
problem with type-specic quotas over rooms, we can have the same student selection for a
controlled student selection problem. But we know that this selection is strategy-proof and
constrained e¢ cient and it also eliminates sg-justied envy.
Remark 14 However, converse of this proposition is not always true. Explicitly, SDR-
TSQB may not produce the same student selection as SDR-TSQR for a problem where the
type-specic quotas over beds are determined by the type-specic quotas over rooms. This
point can be seen in Example 10.
3 Roommate Problem
In the previous section, the students who will get a bed and the type of bed they will get
were determined. After this determination, there are now four disjoint subsets of selected
students which are M2; F 2 (both have cardinalities divisible by 2) and M4; F 4 (both have
cardinalities divisible by 4). Only the students in one of these subsets are guaranteed a bed
and no bed is reserved for more than one student. As a result of this selection, the type
2 dormitory D2 and type 4 dormitory D4 are also decomposed into two disjoint subsets
respectively as follows: the subset D2m (D
2
f) refers to the set of type2 rooms reserved only
for the students in M2 (F 2), and D4m (D
4
f) refers to the set of type4 rooms reserved only for
the students in M4 (F 4).
SUDO uses a second algorithm to assign each student in the above subsets to one of
the rooms which are exactly reserved for these subsets. To start with, each room is already
ordered in its subset by SUDO. This ordering is not based on any criteria. Also, this order
information is not known by the students but it is used in the assignment procedure. We
associate an order functionfor each of these sets. In addition to room order information
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and the studentspriorities, SUDO also considers the studentsdesire of being assigned to a
room with their friends. For this purpose, every student is asked to declare the list of his or
her desired roommates. Therefore, the problem in this section that SUDO deals with is not
only an assignment of the rooms, but also a roommate problem.
Since the situation that the students face is the same for the students in M2 and for the
students in F 2, and similarly it is the same for the students in M4 and for the students in
F 4, in this section we will only consider male students. On the other hand, since a student
in M2 (M4) can be assigned only a type2 (type4) room and since the number of beds in
di¤erent types of rooms di¤ers, the number of roommates of the students in M2 and M4
di¤ers. Therefore, we will consider the problems for these two sets in separate subsections
as follows.
3.1 Roommate Problem for b2 Type Beds
In a roommate problem for b2 type beds, there is a set of students denoted byM2 which has
a nite cardinality divisible by 2. Each student i in M2 is assumed to have a preference
relation Ri on M2. We assume that these preference relations are complete, reexive and
transitive. Completeness requires that for any i; j; k 2 M2, either jRik or kRij, reexivity
requires that for any i; j 2M2, jRij and transitivity requires that for any i; j; k; l 2M2, jRik
and kRil implies jRil. For the associated strict preference relation and indi¤erence
relation, we will use Pi and Ii respectively.
As before, R1i denotes student is rst choice, R
2
i denotes his second choice, and so on. For
any i 2M2; we let Ri such that for any j 2M2, jRii. The set of all preference relations on
M2 is R. A vector consisting of every students preference relations is called a preference
prole and is denoted by R = (R1; :::; RjM2j). The set of all preference proles is denoted
by RM2.
There is an asymmetric, negatively transitive and weakly connected binary relation on
M2 denoted by M2. In fact, this relation is induced by the priority ordering  dened on
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the set of all students N in the previous section. For any student i 2 M2, iM2 is the order
of this student and it is dened as follows: iM2 = 
i   jfj 2 (NnM2)ji > jgj.
There is a set of type2 rooms D2m where jD2mj = jM
2j
2
. An associated function o2m gives
the order of each room in D2m. That is, o
2
m : D
2
m ! f1; 2; :::; jM
2j
2
g. We call this function
room ordering.
The roommate problem for b2 type beds (hereafter, b2-RP) is a vector consisting
of the set of students M2, the priority ordering M2, the set of type2 rooms D2m; the room
ordering function o2m and a preference prole R: (M
2; M2 ; D
2
m; o
2
m; R). However, since in
our model only R can be di¤erent between any two di¤erent b2-RPs, with abuse of notation
we will use R also for a b2-RP. By the same reasoning, the set of all b2-RPs is denoted by
RM2.
An outcome of a b2-RP is a partition of M2 into jM2j=2 disjoint pairs. We call this
outcome a matching and denote it by . In fact, a matching  is a one-to-one mapping
fromM2 onto itself such that for all fi; jg M2 where i 6= j; (i) = j if and only if (j) = i.4
Each student in such a pair is called the roommate of the other student in this pair. The
set of all matchings for a b2-RP is denoted byM2.
Two students fi; jg; i 6= j block a matching  if jPi(i) and iPj(j). We call such a pair
as a blocking pair. A central issue for a roommate problem is the existence of a matching
in which there are no blocking pairs. If such a matching exists, we say that it is stable. A
matching  2M2 is Pareto e¢ cient if there does not exist any 0 2M2 such that for each
i 2M2; 0(i)Ri(i) and there exits at least one i 2M2 where 0(i)Pi(i).
A roommate rule for b2-RPs (hereafter, 2-RR) T is a systematic procedure that produces
a matching for each b2-RP. That is, T : RM2 !M2. A 2-RR T is Pareto e¢ cient if for each
R 2 RM2, T (R) is Pareto e¢ cient.
In the literature, b2-RP is known as a roommate problem. Gale and Shapley (1962)
4In the literature, in a matching  also some students can be matched to himself. That is, (i) = i.
However, SUDOs objective is to ll all the rooms and so every student must be matched to someone in a
b2-RP.
23
showed that stable matchings may not exist in a roommate problem with strict preferences.
An example is as follows.
Example 15 Consider M2 = fi; j; k; lg and the following strict preferences:
i j k l
j k i i
k i j j
l l l k
i j k l
There are no stable matchings for this roommate problem since any matching must pair
someone with student l, and that someone will be able to nd another person to make a
blocking pair. That is, the possible matchings are
1 = ffi; jg; fk; lgg; 2 = ffi; lg; fj; kgg; 3 = ffi; kg; fj; lgg
But fj; kg; fi; kg and fi; jg block 1; 2 and 3, respectively.
In the literature, there is also a closely related problem, namely the marriage problem
(Gale and Shapley (1962)) which is much more fully discussed (see Roth and Sotomayor
(1990)). A marriage problem is that of matching n men and n women, each of whom has
ranked the members of the opposite sex in order of preference. Indeed, a marriage problem
is a special case of the roommate problem. Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the Gale
and Shapley algorithm which produces a stable matching for a marriage problem when the
agentspreferences are strict.
Knuth (1976) observed that for the roommate problem with strict preferences, even when
there exists a stable matching, Gale and Shapley algorithm may produce an unstable match-
ing for this problem. However, later Irving (1986) introduced an e¢ cientalgorithm which
detects whether a roommate problem with strict preference prole has a stable matching and
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nds one if there is any. Moreover, Tan (1991) proposed a necessary and su¢ cient condition
which guarantees a stable matching for a roommate problem when the agents possess strict
preferences.
Chung (2000) pointed to the restriction on agentspreferences in a marriage problem
which makes the problem a special case of the roommate problem. He then asked whether
there are other restrictions which provide the roommate problem to have a stable solution.
He proposed a su¢ cient condition called no odd rings for a roommate problem to have
a stable solution even when the preferences are not strict. Besides, he gave economically
more intuitive conditions which implies the no odd rings condition such as agents having
dichotomous preferences(see Chung (2000) for further survey). He also showed that the
Roth-Vande Vate (1990) process (which is originally proposed for the marriage problem to
nd a stable matching by starting from a random matching and satisfying each blocking
pair whenever there is one) can be used for the roommate problem to nd a stable matching
whenever the no odd rings condition holds.
A preference prole is dichotomous if every student classies every other student into
two groups in such a way that he is indi¤erent among students in each group. Explicitly, for
student i, let R1i be the rst indi¤erence class and R
2
i be the second indi¤erence class where
R1i [ R2i = M2. For any j; k 2 R1i ; it is the case that jIik and for any l;m 2 R2i ; lIim. At
the same time, for any j 2 R1i and for any l 2 R2i ; jPil.
The following proposition is due to Chung (2000).
Proposition 16 If the preference prole is dichotomous, there exist stable matching for a
roommate problem.
Proof. Di¤erent from Chung (2000), we will prove the proposition by using the Roth-Vande
Vate (1990) random paths to stability algorithm.
Let 1 be an arbitrary matching. Suppose that 1 has a blocking pair fi1; i2g. (If no
blocking pairs exist, then we are done.) That is, i2Pi11(i1) and i1Pi21(i2). Make i1; i2 a
pair and 1(i1); 1(i2) another pair. Let other pairs in 1 be the same. Now, we have another
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matching 2. Note that, from now on i1 or i2 can never be in another blocking pair since the
preferences are dichotomous and so @j 2M2 such that jPi1i2 and @k 2M2 such that jPi2i1.
Proceed for i2 and the other matchings that may appear in the same way. Since there is a
nite number of students, after a nite step we will get the desired stable matching.
To assign the students to the rooms with their friends, SUDO asks each student to declare
his roommate list. Therefore, each student classies every other student into two groups.
Specically for each student i, a student j in his roommate list is in is top choice indi¤erence
class R1i and a student k not in his roommate list is in is bottom choice indi¤erence class
R2i . Hence, each student has dichotomous preferences over the set of students. Also, SUDO
restricts each student, who will get a b2 type bed, to declare at most one student in his
roommate list. Therefore, each students top choice indi¤erence class is either singleton or
empty.
By the above proposition, we know that there exists a stable matching for a roommate
problem with dichotomous preference prole. However, SUDOs roommate algorithm may
produce an unstable matching for this problem. Also, the matching may be Pareto ine¢ cient.
Next, we will analyze these issues. SUDO roommate rule for b2 type beds (hereafter, SUDO-
2RR) is as follows:
3.1.1 The SUDO Roommate Rule for b2 Type Beds (SUDO-2RR)
SUDO-2RR works in two stages. The rst stage separate the set of students into disjoint
subsets and the second stage assigns the students to their actual rooms.
Stage 1: First stage is the formation of pairs and singles based on priorities and declared
roommate lists.
Step 1 : Start with student i in M2 with iM2 = 1 and consider R
1
i .
Case 1 [R1i = ;]: Leave i as single.
Case 2 [R1i 6= ;]: Consider R1j where R1i = fjg.
Case 2.1 [i 62 R1j ]: Leave i as single.
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Case 2.1 [i 2 R1j ]: Make i and j a pair.
In general at
Step k : Consider student i with iM2 = k and consider R
1
i .
Case 1 [i is in a pair]: Leave i with his roommate.
Case 2 [R1i = ;]: Leave i as single.
Case 3 [R1i 6= ;]: Consider R1j where R1i = fjg.
Case 3.1 [i 62 R1j ]: Leave i as single.
Case 3.1 [i 2 R1j ]: Make i and j a pair.
The algorithm terminates at Step jM2j.
In fact, the outcome of this rst stage is a matching of the students in M2. In this
matching , for any student i 2 M2, either (i) = i which means student i is single or
(i) = j where j 6= i and (j) = i which means students i and j are roommates.
Stage 2: Second stage is the assignment of actual rooms based on room order informa-
tion, priorities and the rst stages outcome.
Associate a counter to each room r2l in D
2
m as follows: co2m(r2l ) keeps track of how many
beds are still available in room r2l . Initially each counter is equal to 2.
Step 1 : Start with student i in M2 with iM2 = 1. Assign i to room r
2
l 2 D2m with
o2m(r
2
l ) = 1.
Case 1 [(i) = i]: Depending on the room i is assigned, the associated room counter is
decreased by one.
Case 2 [(i) = j]: Assign j to the room i is assigned. The associated room counter is
decreased by two.
Step 2 : Consider student i in M2 with iM2 = 2.
Case 1 [i is assigned a room]: Leave i in his room with his roommate.
Case 2 [i is not assigned a room]: Assign i to room r2l 2 D2m with o2m(r2l ) = 2.
Case 2.1 [(i) = i]: Depending on the room i is assigned, the associated room counter
is decreased by one.
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Case 2.2 [(i) = j]: Assign j to the room i is assigned. The associated room counter is
decreased by two.
In general at
Step k : Consider student i in M2 with iM2 = k.
Case 1 [8r2l 2 D2m, co2m(r2l ) = 0]: Terminate the algorithm.
Case 2 [9r2l 2 D2m such that co2m(r2l ) 6= 0]:
Case 2.1 [i is assigned a room]: Leave i in his room with his roommate.
Case 2.2 [i is not assigned a room and 9r2l 2 D2m such that co2m(r2l ) = 2]: Assign i to room
r2l 2 D2m where co2m(r2l ) = 2 and 8r2p 2 D2m with co2m(r2p) = 2; o2m(r2l )  o2m(r2p).
Case 2.2.1 [(i) = i]: Depending on the room i is assigned, the associated room counter
is decreased by one.
Case 2.2.2 [(i) = j]: Assign j to the room i is assigned. The associated room counter
is decreased by two.
Case 2.3 [i is not assigned a room and /9r2l 2 D2m such that co2m(r2l ) = 2]: Assign i to room
r2l 2 D2m where co2m(r2l ) = 1 and 8r2p 2 D2m with co2m(r2p) = 1; o2m(r2l )  o2m(r2p). Depending on
the room i is assigned, the associated room counter is decreased by one.
The algorithm terminates when there are no students left to consider or all the counters
are equal to zero.
SUDO-2RRs main objective is to assign the students to the rooms, not to match the
students to students. Because of this, the members of the pairs that may appear in the
outcome of the rst stage can be separated in the second stage. However, this causes the
outcome of SUDO-2RR being unstable and Pareto ine¢ cient. An example is as follows.
Example 17 Consider a b2-RP with M2 = fi1; i2; :::; i6g where for any ik 2 M2; ikM2 = k
and the following dichotomous preferences:
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6
fi2g fi3g fi6g fi5g fi4g fi1g
M2nfi2g M2nfi3g M2nfi6g M2nfi5g M2nfi4g M2nfi1g
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The algorithm used in the rst stage makes the pair fi4; i5g and leaves the other students
single. However, the algorithm used in the second stage assigns students i1; i4 to the rst
room, students i2; i5 to the second room and students i3; i6 to the third room. Therefore,
SUDO-2RR produces matching  which matches i1 and i4; i2 and i5; i3 and i6: However,
there is a blocking pair fi4; i5g for this matching. Hence,  is unstable.
Also, another matching 0, which matches i1 and i2; i4 and i5; i3 and i6; Pareto dominates
. Therefore, SUDO-2RR is also Pareto ine¢ cient.
However, these failures of SUDO-2RR disappear if we modify it as follows:
3.1.2 Stable and Pareto E¢ cient Roommate Rule for b2-RP (b2-RR)
We denote this modied version of SUDO-2RR by b2-RR. In this rule, we use SUDOs rst
stage and second stage algorithms as they are. However, we introduce two new algorithms
for the rst stage. The rule b2-RR works as follows:
Run SUDO-2RRs rst stage algorithm. After this algorithm terminates, if all the stu-
dents have a pair, then continue to the second stage. However, if there are some single
students, then run the following algorithm before going to the second stage:
Second Algorithm:
Separate students (who are single in the outcome of the rst stage) from M2 and make
the set S from these single students. Order the students in S by S induced by ordering
function  as follows: For every i 2 S, iS = iM2   jfj 2 (M2nS)jiM2 > jM2gj.
Step 1 : Start with student i in S with iS = 1 and consider R
1
i .
Case 1 [R1i = ;]: Leave i as single.
Case 2 [R1i = fjg]: Make i and j a pair.
In general at
Step k : Consider student i in S with iS = k.
Case 1 [i already has a pair]: Leave i with his mate.
Case 2 [i does not have a pair]:
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Case 2.1 [R1i = ;]: Leave i as single.
Case 2.2 [R1i = fjg]: Make i and j a pair.
The algorithm terminates after step jSj.
Now, if all the students have a pair in the outcome of this algorithm, then continue to
the second stage. However, if there are still some single students, then run the following
algorithm before going to the second stage:
Third Algorithm:
Separate students (who are single in the outcome of the second algorithm) from S and
make the set SS from these single students. Order the students in SS by SS induced by
ordering function  as follows: For every i 2 SS, iSS = iS   jfj 2 (SnSS)jiS > jSgj.
Step 1 : Make students i; j in SS a pair where iSS = 1 and 
j
SS = 2:
In general at
Step k : Make students i; j in SS a pair where iSS = 2k   1 and jSS = 2k:
The algorithm terminates after step jSSj
2
.
After the rst stage, all students must have a pair. Because of this, no pair can be splitted
o¤ in the second stage. Therefore, every member of a pair in the outcome of the rst stage
will be assigned the same room. Hence, the outcome of the second stage will be identical to
the rst stages.
We had discussed that SUDO-2RR may produce unstable and Pareto ine¢ cient match-
ings for instances of b2-RPs. Next, we will show that b2-RR eliminates these shortcomings.
Proposition 18 The rule b2-RR produces a stable matching for any problem b2-RP with
dichotomous preference prole.
Proof. If b2-RRs outcome  is produced by the rst algorithm, then it must be the case
that each student is roommate (i) is already in his roommate list. That is, (i) 2 R1i .
Therefore, no student i can nd another student j where jPi(i). However, if it is produced
by the second or third algorithm, then there must be a student i where his current roommate
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(i) is not in his roommate list. That is, (i) 62 R1i . However, i can not nd another student
j to form a blocking pair. Otherwise, they must already be paired in the rst algorithm.
Proposition 19 The rule b2-RR produces a Pareto e¢ cient matching  for any problem
b2-RP with dichotomous preference prole where for any i 2M2, jR1i j  1.
Proof. Since at least one of the students in the pairs produced by the rst or second
algorithm is matched to his top choice, any other matching which changes these pairs will
hurt at least one of these students. Therefore, any Pareto dominating matching 0 must
contain the pairs produced by the rst or second algorithm. On the other hand, for any two
students i; j 2 SS; R1i 6= fjg. Hence, any student i 2 SS can not be better-o¤ unless he is
matched to student j 2M2nSS where R1i = fjg.
Note that if the top choice indi¤erence classes can contain more than one student, then
b2-RR may produce Pareto ine¢ cient matchings. An example is as follows.
Example 20 Consider a b2-RP with M2 = fi1; i2; i3; i4g where for any ik 2 M2; ikM2 = k
and the following dichotomous preferences:
i1 i2 i3 i4
fi2; i4g fi1; i3g fi2g fi1g
fi3g fi4g fi1; i4g fi2; i3g
For this problem, b2-RR produces stable matching  which makes i1; i2 a pair and i3; i4
a pair. However, it is Pareto dominated by matching 0 which makes i1; i4 a pair and i2; i3
a pair.
Next, we analyze the roommate problem where the rooms have four beds. Therefore, for
any student there will be more than one roommate in an outcome of a roommate formation.
As far as we know, this will be the rst analysis of such a problem.
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3.2 Roommate Problem for b4 Type Beds
In a roommate problem for b4 type beds, there is a set of students denoted byM4 which has
a nite cardinality divisible by 4. Each student i in M4 is assumed to have a preference
relation Ri on M4. We assume that these preference relations are complete, reexive and
transitive. For the associated strict preference relation and indi¤erence relation, we
will use Pi and Ii respectively.
As before, R1i denotes student is rst choice, R
2
i denotes his second choice, and so on. For
any i 2M4; we let Ri such that for any j 2M4, jRii. The set of all preference relations on
M4 is R. A vector consisting of every students preference relations is called a preference
prole and is denoted by R = (R1; :::; RjM4j). The set of all preference proles is denoted
by RM4.
For each student i; a binary relation Pi on (M4)3 induced by Ri is dened as follows:
for any fa; b; cg; fj; k; lg 2 (M4)3, fa; b; cgPifj; k; lg if there exist p 2 fa; b; cg, q 2 fj; k; lg
such that pRiq and there exist r 2 fa; b; cgnfpg, s 2 fj; k; lgnfqg such that rRis and for t 2
fa; b; cgnfp; rg; u 2 fj; k; lgnfq; sg it is the case that tRiu and at least one of these relations
is strict. Indeed, Pi is an asymmetric and negatively transitive binary relation. We call Pi
as a group preference relation. For the negation of Pi, we will use ~Pi. The associated
group indi¤erence relation Ii is dened as follows: for any fa; b; cg; fj; k; lg 2 (M4)3,
fa; b; cgIifj; k; lg if and only if fa; b; cg ~Pifj; k; lg and fj; k; lg ~Pifa; b; cg.
For student i, P1i denotes student is rst group choice, P2i denotes his second group
choice, and so on. A vector consisting of every students group preference relations is called
a group preference prole and is denoted by P = (P1; :::;PjM4j).
There is an asymmetric, negatively transitive and weakly connected binary relation on
M4 denoted by M4. In fact, this relation is induced by the priority ordering  dened on
the set of all students N in the previous section. For any student i 2 M4, iM4 is the order
of this student and it is dened as follows: iM4 = 
i   jfj 2 (NnM4)ji > jgj.
There is a set of type4 rooms D4m where jD4mj = jM
4j
4
. An associated function o4m gives
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the order of each room in D4m. That is, o
4
m : D
4
m ! f1; 2; :::; jM
4j
4
g. We call this function
room ordering.
The roommate problem for b4 type beds (hereafter, b4-RP) is a vector consisting
of the set of students M4, the priority ordering M4, the set of type4 rooms D4m; the room
ordering function o4m and a preference prole R: (M
4; M4 ; D
4
m; o
4
m; R). However, since in
our model only R can be di¤erent between any two di¤erent b4-RPs, with abuse of notation
we will use R also for a b4-RP. By the same reasoning, the set of all b4-RPs is denoted by
RM4.
An outcome of a b4-RP is a partition of M4 into jM4j=4 disjoint groups. We call this
outcome a matching and denote it by . In fact, a matching  is a one-to-one mapping
from M4 into (M4)3 such that for each i 2 M4; j(i)j = 3 and for every i; j; k 2 M4; if
j 2 (i) and k 2 (i) then j 2 (k) and k 2 (j). Each student in such a group is called
the roommate of the other students in this group. The set of all matchings for a b4-RP is
denoted byM4.
Four students fi; j; k; lg such that i 6= j 6= k 6= l block a matching  if fj; k; lgPi(i),
fi; k; lgPj(j), fi; j; lgPk(k) and fi; j; kgPl(l). We call such a group as a blocking group.
In a matching , if there are no blocking groups, we say that  is stable. A matching  2M4
is Pareto e¢ cient if there does not exist any 0 2M4 such that for each i 2M4; (i) ~Pi0(i)
and there exits at least one i 2M2 where 0(i)Pi(i).
A roommate rule for b4-RPs (hereafter, 4-RR) F is a systematic procedure that produces
a matching for each b4-RP. That is, F : RM4 ! M4. A 4-RR F is Pareto e¢ cient if for
each R 2 RM4, F(R) is Pareto e¢ cient.
Since the cardinality of the set of students is nite, for any R there must be a Pareto
e¢ cient matching . However, for some R; there may not exist a stable matching as the
following example suggests:
Example 21 Consider a b4-RP with M4 = fi1; i2; :::; i8g where for any ik 2 M4; ikM4 = k
and the following strict preferences:
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i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8
i2 i3 i4 i5 i1 i7 i8 i6
i3 i4 i5 i1 i2 i8 i6 i7
i4 i5 i1 i2 i3 i1 i1 i1
i5 i1 i2 i3 i4 i2 i2 i2
i6 i6 i6 i6 i6 i3 i3 i3
i7 i7 i7 i7 i7 i4 i4 i4
i8 i8 i8 i8 i8 i5 i5 i5
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8
From these preferences, we can construct the rst ve studentspreferences over 3-student
groups among each other as follows:
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
fi2; i3; i4g fi3; i4; i5g fi4; i5; i1g fi5; i1; i2g fi1; i2; i3g
fi2; i3; i5g fi3; i4; i1g fi4; i5; i2g fi5; i1; i3g fi1; i2; i4g
fi2; i4; i5g fi3; i5; i1g fi4; i1; i2g fi5; i2; i3g fi1; i3; i4g
fi3; i4; i5g fi4; i5; i1g fi5; i1; i2g fi1; i2; i3g fi2; i3; i4g
Five possible matchings where each makes four of these ve students roommate to each
other are as below:
1 = ffi1; i2; i3; i4g; fi5; i6; i7; i8gg; 2 = ffi5; i2; i3; i4g; fi1; i6; i7; i8gg; 3 = ffi5; i1; i3; i4g; fi2; i6; i7; i8gg;
4 = ffi5; i1; i2; i4g; fi3; i6; i7; i8gg; 5 = ffi5; i1; i2; i3g; fi4; i6; i7; i8gg
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However, fi5; i2; i3; i4g block 1; fi5; i1; i3; i4g block 2; fi5; i1; i2; i4g block 3; fi5; i1; i2; i3g
block 4; and fi1; i2; i3; i4g block 5. Therefore, these matchings turn to one another and
the following cycle occurs:
1 ! 2 ! 3 ! 4 ! 5 ! 1
On the other hand, the other possible matchings are also not stable. These matchings
and corresponding blocking groups are as follows. Below fx; y; zg = fi6; i7; i8g.
1.  = ffi1; i2; x; yg; fi3; i4; i5; zgg is blocked by fi2; i3; i4; i5g and 2 occurs.
2.  = ffi1; i3; x; yg; fi2; i4; i5; zgg is blocked by fi1; i2; i4; i5g or fi2; i3; i4; i5g and 4 or 2
occurs respectively.
3.  = ffi1; i4; x; yg; fi2; i3; i5; zgg is blocked by fi1; i2; i3; i5g or fi2; i3; i4; i5g and 5 or 2
occurs respectively.
4.  = ffi1; i5; x; yg; fi2; i3; i4; zgg is blocked by fi1; i2; i3; i4g and 1 occurs.
5.  = ffi2; i3; x; yg; fi1; i4; i5; zgg is blocked by fi1; i3; i4; i5g and 3 occurs.
6.  = ffi2; i4; x; yg; fi1; i3; i5; zgg is blocked by fi1; i2; i3; i5g or fi1; i3; i4; i5g and 5 or 3
occurs respectively.
7.  = ffi2; i5; x; yg; fi1; i3; i4; zgg is blocked by fi1; i2; i3; i4g or fi1; i3; i4; i5g and 1 or 3
occurs respectively.
8.  = ffi3; i4; x; yg; fi1; i2; i5; zgg is blocked by fi1; i2; i4; i5g and 4 occurs.
9.  = ffi3; i5; x; yg; fi1; i2; i4; zgg is blocked by fi1; i2; i3; i4g or fi1; i2; i4; i5g and 1 or 4
occurs respectively.
10.  = ffi4; i5; x; yg; fi1; i2; i3; zgg is blocked by fi1; i2; i3; i5g and 5 occurs.
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But we know that 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 are not stable matchings. Therefore, there is not any
stable matching for this example.
In the previous subsection, we see that when the preference prole is dichotomous, then
there exist a stable matching for a b2-RP. In a b2-RP, every student is to be matched to a
student. However, in a b4-RP, each student is to be matched to a 3-student group. Therefore,
a natural question arises as follows. In a b4-RP, if each students group preference relation is
dichotomous, can there exist a stable matching for this problem? The following proposition
answers this question a¢ rmatively.
Proposition 22 For a b4-RP, if the group preference prole P is dichotomous, then there
exist a stable matching for this problem.
The proof is similar to the proof of Chungs (2000) proposition since the structure of
these two problems are the same.
Proof. Let 1 be an arbitrary matching. Suppose that 1 has a blocking group fa; b; c; dg.
(If no blocking groups exist, then we are done.) That is, fb; c; dgPa1(a); fa; c; dgPb1(b);
fa; b; dgPc1(c) and fa; b; cgPd1(d). Make a; b; c; d a group. Now, the set [1(a) [ 1(b) [
1(c)[1(d)]nfa; b; c; dg has cardinality divisible by four. Make groups from the students in
this set by using their priority ordering. Explicitly, make the rst four students a group, the
second four students another group and so on. Let other groups in 1 be the same. Now,
we have another matching 2. Note that, from now on a; b; c; d can never be in another
blocking group since the preferences are dichotomous and therefore @A 2 (M4)3 such that
APafb; c; dg; @B 2 (M4)3 such that BPbfa; c; dg; @C 2 (M4)3 such that CPcfa; b; dg and
@D 2 (M4)3 such that DPdfa; b; cg. Proceed for i2 and the other matchings that may appear
in the same way. Since there is a nite number of students, after a nite step we will get the
desired stable matching.
In fact, a dichotomous group preference prole can be constructed from the students
preferences when these preferences are dichotomous and each top choice indi¤erence class
can contain at most one student. It is because for each student i any 3-student group A will
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be in his rst group choice P1i if A contains R1i and any 3-student group B will be in his
second group choice P2i if B does not contain R1i . Therefore, the following corollary applies.
Corollary 23 For a b4-RP, if the preference prole R is dichotomous and for each i 2M4;
jR1i j  1, then there exist a stable matching for this problem.
As it is done for the problem b2-RP, to assign the students to the rooms with their friends,
SUDO asks each student in M4 to declare his roommate list. Therefore, each student clas-
sies every other student into two groups. Hence, each student has dichotomous preferences
over the set of students. Also, SUDO restricts each student, who will get a b4 type bed,
to declare at most three students in his roommate list. Therefore, the cardinality of each
students top choice indi¤erence class is at most three.
For this problem b4-RP, SUDO uses an algorithm to assign the students to the rooms.
However, we do not know whether a stable matching always exists for this problem. But,
on the other hand, SUDOs roommate algorithm may produce an unstable matching even
when there exist a stable matching for it. Also, the outcome of the SUDO algorithm may
be Pareto ine¢ cient in some cases. Before analyzing SUDOs algorithm, we will state the
following propositions which guarantee the existence of a stable matching for a b4-RP under
certain assumptions.
Proposition 24 For a b4-RP, if the preference prole R is dichotomous and for each i 2
M4; jR1i j  2, then there exist a stable matching for this problem.
For the proof, we will use a similar approach to the Roth-Vande Vate (1990) random
paths to stability algorithm. Our aim is to show the existence of a 4-student group which
can never be broken by any subgroup of its members. Then, deductively we will get the
desired matching.
Proof. Start with a random matching. If there does not exist any blocking group, then
we are done. If not, then there exists at least one blocking group. Let this group be
G = fa; b; c; dg: Observe that none of the students by himself can break this group since at
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least one of his top choices is already a roommate of him and outside of this group, there
can be at most one student in his top choice. For the blocking group G, there can be the
following cases:
Case 1 [jfi 2 G : R1i  Ggj  3]: The group can not be broken since all the students,
whose top choice class is a subset of G, will never break this group. On the other hand, the
student, whose top choice class is not a subset of G, can not break tis group by himself by
the above reasoning.
Case 2 [b 2 R1a ^ c 2 R1b ^ d 2 R1c ^ a 2 R1d]: The group can not be broken since for any
member of a subgroup which breaks the group, there can be at most one student in his top
choice outside of the group.
Case 3 [(c 2 R1a \R1b)^fa; bg = R1c ]: The group can not be broken since no two or three
of the students in the group can break it. It is because c already has his both top choices in
the group and therefore he will not break it. But then, none of the other students will break
the group since outside of this group, there can be at most one student in their top choice
classes.
Case 4 [b 2 R1a^ c 2 R1b ^a 2 R1c ^d 62 R1a[R1b [R1c ]: The group may be broken by a; b; c
and e where e 2 R1a \R1b \R1c . However, now for group fa; b; c; eg it is Case 1 and therefore
it can not be broken.
Case 5 [b 2 R1a ^ a 2 R1b ^ (c; d 62 R1a [ R1b)]: The group may be broken by a; b; e and f
where R1a  fb; e; fg and R1b  fa; e; fg. Now for this new blocking group fa; b; e; fg if it is
one of the above rst three cases, then this group can not be broken. However, if it is Case 4,
then we know that this group may be broken, but then there must be another group which
can not be broken. But, if it is again Case 5, then fa; b; e; fg may be broken by e; f; g and
h where R1e  ff; g; hg and R1f  fe; g; hg. For the worst-case scenario, there may occur a
sequence of these blocking groups where each group possesses Case 5. However, since there
is a nite number of students, this sequence should terminate after a nite number of steps.
So after the nal step, we would have a group which can not be broken.
Since presence of an unbreakable group in the problem would not a¤ect the decision of
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the other students, we can separate this group from the rest of the problem. But then, we
will have a smaller problem which owns the same structure as the original one. Since there
is a nite number of students, by deductive reasoning after a nite number of steps, we will
get the desired partition of the set of students.
When we observe the roommate lists of students in a real-life roommate problem, it is
very likely to see that when student j is in student is roommate list, then i is also in js
roommate list. It is because when i decides to add j to his list, i should already know js
decision about adding i to his list. Then, if i is not in js list, he will probably think that he
has no right to add j to his list. If we apply this assumption to b4-RPs where roommate lists
can contain at most three students (as SUDO requires), then by the following proposition
we see that there always exist stable matchings for them.
Proposition 25 For a b4-RP, if the preference prole R is dichotomous, for each i 2 M4;
jR1i j  3 and for each i; j 2 M4; j 2 R1i if and only if i 2 R1j ; then there exist a stable
matching for this problem.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
SUDO may want to adopt the procedure used for the proof of Proposition 25 to form the
roommate groups. However, the actual dichotomous preference prole of the students may
not own the assumptions in the statement of this proposition. Indeed, this type of roommate
list declaration can be caused by coordination problems. But, SUDO can solve this problem
as follows:
Allow every student to declare any subset of the students except himself as his roommate
list. Then, for each student i, remove every student j; who does not declare i in his roommate
list, from is roommate list. Then, for the rst student i, remove every student except the
rst three ones from is roommate list. Except from these rst three studentslists, remove
i from every other studentslist. Then, for the second student, proceed as it is done for the
rst student and so on. At the end, the kind of preference prole in Proposition 25 will be
constructed.
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Next, we will introduce SUDOs roommate rule for b4 type beds (hereafter, SUDO-4RR).
Then, we will investigate its shortcomings.
3.2.1 The SUDO Roommate Rule for b4 Type Beds (SUDO-4RR)
Similar to the rule SUDO-2RR, SUDO-4RR works in two stages. The rst stage splits the
set of students into disjoint subsets and the second stage assigns the students to their actual
rooms.
Stage 1: First stage is the formation of singles, pairs, 3-student and 4-student groups
based on priorities and declared roommate lists.
Step 1 : Start with student i in M4 with iM4 = 1 and consider R
1
i .
Case 1 [jR1i j = 0]: Leave i as single. Remove him from all the other studentstop choice
classes.
Case 2 [jR1i j = 1]: Consider R1j where R1i = fjg.
Case 2.1 [i 62 R1j ]: Leave i as single. Remove him from all the other studentstop choice
classes.
Case 2.1 [i 2 R1j ]: Make i and j a pair. Remove them from all the other studentstop
choice classes.
Case 3 [jR1i j = 2]: Consider R1j where R1i = fj; kg and j < k.
Case 3.1 [i 62 R1j ]: Consider R1k.
Case 3.1.1 [i 62 R1k]: Leave i as single. Remove him from all the other studentstop
choice classes.
Case 3.1.2 [i 2 R1k]: Make i and k a pair. Remove them from all the other students
top choice classes.
Case 3.2 [i 2 R1j ]: Consider R1k.
Case 3.2.1 [i 62 R1k]: Make i and j a pair. Remove them from all the other students
top choice classes.
Case 3.2.2 [i 2 R1k ^ j 62 R1k]: Make i and j a pair. Remove them from all the other
studentstop choice classes.
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Case 3.2.3 [i 2 R1k ^ j 2 R1k ^ k 62 R1j ]: Make i and k a pair. Leave j as single. Remove
i and k from all the other studentstop choice classes.
Case 3.2.4 [i 2 R1k ^ j 2 R1k ^ k 2 R1j ]: Make i; j and k a 3-student group. Remove
them from all the other studentstop choice classes.
Case 4 [jR1i j = 3]: Consider R1j where R1i = fj; k; lg and j < k < l.
Case 4.1 [i 62 R1j ]: Proceed as Case 3.
Case 4.2 [i 2 R1j ]: Consider R1k.
Case 4.2.1 [i 62 R1k]: Consider R1l . Proceed as Case 3.2 for i; j; l.
Case 4.2.2 [i 2 R1k ^ j 62 R1k]: Consider R1l . Proceed as Case 3.2 for i; j; l.
Case 4.2.3 [i 2 R1k ^ j 2 R1k]: Consider R1l .
Case 4.2.3.1 [i 62 R1l ]: Make i; j and k a 3-student group. Remove them from all the
other studentstop choice classes.
Case 4.2.3.2 [i 2 R1l ^ j 62 R1l ]: Make i; j and k a 3-student group. Remove them from
all the other studentstop choice classes.
Case 4.2.3.3 [i 2 R1l ^ j 2 R1l ^ k 62 R1l ]: Make i; j and k a 3-student group. Remove
them from all the other studentstop choice classes.
Case 4.2.3.4 [i 2 R1l ^ j 2 R1l ^ k 2 R1l ]: Make i; j; k and l a 4-student group. Remove
them from all the other studentstop choice classes.
In general at
Step k : Consider student i with iM4 = k and consider R
1
i .
Case 1 [i is not single]: Leave i in his group.
Case 2 [i is single]: Proceed as Step 1.
The algorithm terminates at Step jM4j. Now, the setM4 is separated into disjoint subsets
where some of these subsets are singleton, some consist of two students, some consist of three
students and some consist of four students.
Stage 2: Second stage is the assignment of actual rooms based on room order informa-
tion, priorities and the rst stages outcome.
Associate a counter to each room r4l in D
4
m as follows: co4m(r4l ) keeps track of how many
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beds are still available in room r4l . Initially each counter is equal to 4.
Step 1 : Start with student i in M4 with iM4 = 1. Assign i to room r
4
l 2 D4m with
o4m(r
4
l ) = 1.
Case 1 [i is single]: The associated room counter is decreased by one.
Case 2 [i is not single]: Assign other members of the group to the room i is assigned.
The associated room counter is decreased by the size of the group.
Step 2 : Consider student i in M4 with iM4 = 2.
Case 1 [i is assigned a room]: Leave i in his room with his roommate(s).
Case 2 [i is not assigned a room]: Assign i to room r4l 2 D4m with o4m(r4l ) = 2.
Case 2.1 [i is single]: The associated room counter is decreased by one.
Case 2.2 [i is not single]: Assign other members of the group to the room i is assigned.
The associated room counter is decreased by the size of the group.
In general at
Step k : Consider student i in M4 with iM4 = k.
Case 1 [8r4l 2 D4m, co4m(r4l ) = 0]: Terminate the algorithm.
Case 2 [9r4l 2 D4m such that co4m(r4l ) 6= 0]:
Case 2.1 [i is assigned a room]: Leave i in his room with his roommate(s).
Case 2.2 [i is not assigned a room]: Assign i to room r4l 2 D4m where co4m(r4l ) 6= 0 and
8r4p 2 D4m with co4m(r4p) 6= 0; o4m(r4l )  o4m(r4p).
Case 2.2.1 [i is single]: The associated room counter is decreased by one.
Case 2.2.2 [i is not single]: Assign other than i the rst (co4m(r4l )   1) members of the
group to the room i is assigned. The associated room counter is decreased by the number
of students assigned in this step.
The algorithm terminates when there are no students left to consider or all the counters
are equal to zero.
Like SUDO-2RR, SUDO-4RRs main objective is to assign the students to the rooms,
not to match the students to students. Because of this, the members of the groups that may
appear in the outcome of the rst stage can be separated in the second stage. However, even
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the outcome of the rst stage is stable and/or Pareto e¢ cient, this separation may cause the
outcome of SUDO-4RR being unstable and/or Pareto ine¢ cient.
The following example is an instance of a b4-RP described in Corollary 23 (Preference
prole is dichotomous and each students top choice class can contain at most one student).
Therefore, there exists at least one stable matching for it.
Example 26 Consider a b4-RP with M4 = fi1; i2; :::; i12g where for any ik 2 M4; ikM4 = k
and the following dichotomous preferences:
i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6
i2 i3 i1 i5 i6 i4
M4nfi2g M4nfi3g M4nfi1g M4nfi5g M4nfi6g M4nfi4g
i7 i8 i9 i10 i11 i12
i8 i9 i7 i2 i6 i7
M4nfi8g M4nfi9g M4nfi7g M4nfi2g M4nfi6g M4nfi7g
For these preferences and priorities, SUDO-4RRs rst stage algorithm leaves every stu-
dent as single. The second stage algorithm assigns students i1; i4; i7 and i10 to the rst room,
students i2; i5; i8 and i11 to the second room and students i3; i6; i9 and i12 to the third room.
Therefore, SUDO-4RR produces matching  = ffi1; i4; i7; i10g; fi2; i5; i8; i11g; fi3; i6; i9; i12gg:
However, there are three blocking groups fi1; i2; i3; i10g; fi4; i5; i6; i11g and fi7; i8; i9; i12g for
this matching. Hence,  is unstable.
On the other hand, a stable matching 0 = ffi1; i2; i3; i10g; fi4; i5; i6; i11g; fi7; i8; i9; i12gg
Pareto dominates . Therefore, SUDO-4RR is Pareto ine¢ cient.
The following example is an instance of a b4-RP described in Proposition 24 or 25.
Therefore, there exists at least one stable matching for it.
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Example 27 Consider a b4-RP with M4 = fi1; i2; :::; i8g where for any ik 2 M4; ikM4 = k
and the following dichotomous preferences:
i1 i2 i3 i4
fi2; i3g fi1; i4g fi1; i4g fi2; i3g
M4nfi2; i3g M4nfi1; i4g M4nfi1; i4g M4nfi2; i3g
i5 i6 i7 i8
fi6; i7g fi5; i8g fi5; i8g fi6; i7g
M4nfi6; i7g M4nfi5; i8g M4nfi5; i8g M4nfi6; i7g
For these preferences and priorities, SUDO-4RRs rst stage algorithm makes pairs
fi1; i2g; fi3; i4g; fi5; i6g and fi7; i8g. The second stage algorithm assigns students i1; i2; i5; i6
to the rst room and i3; i4; i7; i8 to the second room. Therefore, SUDO-4RR produces match-
ing  = ffi1; i2; i5; i6g; fi3; i4; i7; i8gg. However, there are two blocking groups fi1; i2; i3; i4g
and fi5; i6; i7; i8g for this matching. Hence,  is unstable.
On the other hand, a stable matching 0 = ffi1; i2; i3; i4g; fi5; i6; i7; i8gg Pareto dominates
. Therefore, SUDO-4RR produces Pareto ine¢ cient matching for this example.
4 Conclusion
In this section, we list the open questions that one might pursue in a follow-up study.
One of the concerns of the SUDO roommate rules is the order of rooms while assigning
students to their actual rooms. However, this room ordering is not based on any criteria.
On the other hand, the groups may have actual preferences on the set of rooms. A groups
preference order represents the group membersmutual interests on the rooms. Therefore,
instead of assigning students to the rooms by using the randomly determined room orders,
44
we can use these preferences and we can Pareto improve the solution.
However, there appears two major di¢ culties if we apply this approach to the problem.
First, how can we construct a preference relation for each group? Second, how can we set a
unique priority ordering for the set of groups?
Nevertheless, if we have a preference relation and a priority order for each group, then
the problem just becomes the marriage problem. Here, men are the groups and women are
the rooms or vice versa. As Abdulkadiro¼glu and Sönmez (2003) notes, since there is a unique
priority ordering for the groups, we can apply the serial dictatorship rule for this problem
to create a stable, Pareto e¢ cient and strategy-proof solution.
Also, the institutions main concern can be to increase the total welfare of the students.
That is, the institution may want to have a partition of the set of students  to maximize
a social welfare function. For the particular social welfare function, f() =
X
g2
X
i2g
jR1i \ gj
the problem of nding such a partition (matching) is deeply investigated in graph theory
and there are many algorithms which are used to maximize this function. Note that, the
maximizer  must be Pareto e¢ cient. Otherwise, it can not be the maximum.
We show that for a b4-RP, when the preferences are dichotomous and the top choice
classes can contain at most 2 students, then there exists a stable matching. However, we do
not know that a stable matching always exists when the top choice classes can contain at
most 3 students or more. It will be interesting to nd an upperbound for the cardinality of
the top choice classes to guarantee the existence of a stable matching. On the other hand,
we know that for a b2-RP, there is no need to restrict the size of the top choice classes to
have a stable matching. Therefore, a characterization of these upperbounds for the classes
of roommate problems will also be interesting.
Finally, we did not investigate the implications of strategy-proofness for the b4-RP prob-
lem. This also remains an open question for the future.
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5 Appendix
Table 1
Year Number of Applicants Number of Beds
2005 2186 2072
2006 2424 2136
2007 2632 2414
Proof of Proposition 8:
Suppose that for a student selection problem P , GS-SDR produces a Pareto ine¢ cient
student selection . Then there must be at least one other student selection 0 which Pareto
dominates . For such a Pareto dominating 0, there can not be any student i in N where
iPi
0
i and there must be at least one student i in N where 
0
iPii. Since for any i in N ,
0i = P
3
i ) P 3i = ? and since for any i in N s, i 6= P 3i , it must be the case that ~N s = N s
where ~N s is the set of selected students under 0. Otherwise, there must be at least one
student i in N sn ~N s and for that i, iPi0i. But this will contradict with the supposition.
Also, since the preferences are strict, then for every student i in N where 0i ~Pii, 
0
i = i
and for every student i in N where 0iPii, 
0
i 6= i. ~M2; ~M4; ~F 2; ~F 4 refers to the sets of
selected students according to their gender and bed types as in the denition of matching.
Therefore, ~M2 [ ~M4 [ ~F 2 [ ~F 4 = ~N s.
Consider a strictly better o¤ student i in this Pareto dominating selection 0. Without
loss of generality, assume that g(i) = m and i = b2. By the above reasoning, it must be the
case that 0i = b
4. But then, since all the rooms are reserved only for the selected students,
there must be another student j 2 ~N s such that j = b4 and 0j = b2. Since the preferences
are strict, then 0jPjj. Otherwise, since b
2 6= b4, jPj0j and this will contradict with the
supposition that in this new selection 0, there is no student i in N where iPi0i. Therefore,
depending on g(j); there is either sg-justied envy or og-justied envy in the outcome of GS-
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SDR for that problem P since jPii and iPjj and it is the fact that either 
i < j or
j < i holds. By the Proposition 3, however,  can not contain sg-justied envy. Therefore,
it must be the case that g(j) = f .
However, to be a student selection, the Pareto dominating selection must satisfy the
following conditions: j ~M2j and j ~F 2j must be divisible by 2 and j ~M4j and j ~F 4j must be
divisible by 4. Therefore, other than student j there must be at least three female students
k; l; h where 0k = 
0
l = 
0
h = b
2 and k = l = h = b4. Since these female students will be
assigned to rooms inD2, there must be at least three available beds for them. By this reason,
other than student i; there must be at least three male students p; q; r where 0p = 
0
q = 
0
r =
b4 and p = q = r = b2. Now there can be two cases according to 
i and j.
Case 1: i < j. In , even i has higher priority than j, and b4Pib2, he can not be assigned
to b4 but j is assigned to b4. Therefore, student t, who is considered at Step (t) when c4 = 4
must be such that t < i and g(t) = g(j). Otherwise, i can be assigned to b4. At this step, t
is assigned to b4. Meanwhile, male students p; q; r are also assigned to b2 and they all prefer
b4 to b2. Hence, it must be the case that t < p, t < q, and t < r. Otherwise at least one
of students p; q; r can be assigned to b4. Since female students k; l; h are assigned to b4 and
they all prefer b2 to b4, then it must be the case that at least three of students i; p; q; r have
higher ranking than all students j; k; l; h. Otherwise, at least one of students j; k; l; h can be
assigned to b2. Therefore, student t has higher ranking than all these female students. That
is t < j, t < k, t < l, and t < h. But then, this contradicts with the fact that after
student t is assigned to b4, there can be at most three other students who can be assigned
to b4. This is because after Step t, c4  3. Therefore this can not be the case.
Case 2: i > j. In , even j has higher priority than i, and b2Pjb4, she can not be
assigned to b2 but i is assigned to b2. Therefore, the student n, who is considered at Step n
when c2 = 2, must be such that 
n < j and g(n) = g(i). Otherwise, j can be assigned to
b2. At this step, n is assigned to b2. Meanwhile, since male students p; q; r are assigned to
b2, either they all must have higher ranking than n or two of them must have higher ranking
than n and one of them must be n. Otherwise, j can be assigned to b2. However, students
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p; q; r all prefer b4 to b2 and they are assigned to b2 while j is assigned to b4. Hence, student
t, who is considered at Step t when c4 = 4, must be such that 
t < p; t < q; t < r
and g(t) = g(j). Otherwise, one of these male students p; q; r can be assigned to b4. At
this step, t is assigned to b4. Meanwhile, female students k; l; h are also assigned to b4 and
they all prefer b2 to b4. Hence, it must be the case that at least three of students i; p; q; r
have higher ranking than all the students j; k; l; h. Otherwise, at least one of j; k; l; h can
be assigned to b2. Therefore, student t has higher ranking than all these female students.
That is t < j,t < k,t < l, and t < h. But then, this contradicts with the fact that
after student t is assigned to b4, then there can be at most three other students who can be
assigned to b4. This is because after Step t, c4  3. Therefore this can not also be the case.
Since there is no case left, there can not be any student selection in which at least one
student is strictly better o¤ without hurting someone in this selection. 
Proof of Proposition 25: We will prove the proposition by construction in stages.
Stage 1: In this stage, we form 4-student groups which can not be broken. A 4-student
group g4 formed in this stage has the following property. For any student i 2 g4, jR1i \g4j  2.
We denote the set of such groups by Gg41 . We denote the set of students who are in a group
in Gg41 by A1. The set of the remaining students is denoted by A
n
1 =M
4nA1. Any group g4
in Gg41 can not be broken. It is because any student has at least two of his top choices in the
group and outside of this group there can be at most one student from his top choice class.
Now, depending on jAn1 j there can be two cases:
Case 1 [jAn1 j = 0]: We reach the desired matching  = Gg41 .
Case 2 [jAn1 j 6= 0]: We should consider the following stage.
Stage 2: In this stage, we form 3-student groups from the students in An1 . A 3-student
group g3 formed in this stage has the following property. For any i 2 g3, jR1i \ g3j  2. We
denote the set of such groups by Gg31 . We denote the set of students who are in a group
in Gg31 by B1. The set of the remaining students is denoted by B
n
1 = M
4nB1. The groups
formed in this stage are not complete yet. Now, depending on jBn1 j there can be two cases:
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Case 1 [jBn1 j = 0]: We will proceed to the following stage.
Stage 2.1: In this, stage we consider pair of 3-student groups fg3; g03g where there exists
i 2 g3 and j 2 g03 such that j 2 R1i and i 2 R1j . Note that, if such a pair of groups exists,
only a student in each group can be in the other students top choice class. Otherwise, some
of the students in these groups must be in the set A1. Then we form three pair of students
from these pair of 3-student groups in such a way. For the pair fg3; g03g, we form the rst
pair fi; jg from the students i 2 g3 and j 2 g03 such that j 2 R1i and i 2 R1j . We form the
other pairs as g3nfig and g03nfjg. We denote the set of such pair of students by Gg21 . We
denote the set of students who are in a pair in Gg21 by C1. We denote the set of 3-student
groups who are not used to form pair of students by Gg310 . The set of students in a group in
Gg310 is denoted by B2. Now, depending on jB2j there can be two cases:
Case 1.1 [jB2j = 0]: We will proceed to the following stage.
Stage 2.1.1: In this stage, we form 4-student groups from the pairs in Gg21 . We denote
the set of such groups byGg42 . We do not impose any restriction on the formation of 4-student
groups. A 4-student group g4 can be randomly formed. Nevertheless, these groups can not
be broken. It is because of the fact that any student has at least one of his top choices in
the group and there can not be made any 4-student group from these students where each
student has at least two of his top choices in the group. Otherwise, this 4-student group
must be already in Gg41 . Therefore, we reach the desired matching  = G
g4
1 [Gg42 .
Case 1.2 [jB2j 6= 0]: We will proceed to the following stage.
Stage 2.1.2: In this stage, like Stage 2.1, we form three pair of students from the pair
of 3-student groups in Gg310 . However, now we do not impose any restriction on the pair of
3-student groups. We denote the set of pair of students formed in this stage by Gg22 . Then
we consider the following stage.
Stage 2.1.2: In this stage, like Stage 2.1.1, we form 4-student groups from the pairs in
Gg21 [Gg22 . Again, we do not impose any restriction on the formation of groups. We denote
the set of such groups by Gg42 . Again, by the same reasonings as in Stage 2.1.1, the 4-student
groups can not be broken. Therefore, we reach the desired matching  = Gg41 [Gg42 .
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Case 2 [jBn1 j 6= 0]: We should consider the following stage.
Stage 3: In this stage, we form pair of students from the students in Bn1 . A pair g2
formed in this stage has the following property. For any g2 = fi; jg, j 2 R1i and i 2 R1j . We
denote the set of such pair of students by Gg21 . We denote the set of students who are in
a pair in Gg21 by C1. We denote the set of the remaining students by D1 = B
n
1 nC1. Now,
depending on jD1j there can be two cases:
Case 2.1 [jD1j = 0]: We should consider the following stage.
Stage 3.1: This stage is identical to the Stage 2.1. Therefore, at the end of this stage,
we have the following sets: the set of pair of students, which is formed from the students in
B1; denoted by G
g2
2 , the set of 3-student groups who are not used to form pair of students
denoted by Gg32 and the set of students in a group in G
g3
2 is denoted by B2: Now, depending
on jB2j there can be two cases:
Case 2.1.1 [jB2j = 0]: We will proceed to the following stage.
Stage 3.1.1: This stage is similar to the Stage 2.1.1. Now, however, we form 4-student
groups from the pairs in Gg21 [Gg22 . We denote the set of such groups by Gg42 . Again, by the
same reasonings as in Stage 2.1.1, the 4-student groups can not be broken. Therefore, we
reach the desired matching  = Gg41 [Gg42 .
Case 2.1.2 [jB2j 6= 0]: We will proceed to the following stage.
Stage 3.1.2: In this stage, we form singles and pair of students from the 3-student
groups in Gg32 . For each group, we randomly select one student from the group and make
him a single. We leave the other students is this group as a pair. At the end of the stage
we have the following sets: the set of single students denoted by D2 and the set of pair of
students denoted by Gg23 . Then we consider the following stage.
Stage 3.1.2: In this stage, we form 4-student groups from the single students in D2
and pair of students in Gg21 . A 4-student group g4 formed in this stage has the following
properties. First, each group is formed by two single students in D2 and a pair of students
in Gg21 . Second, for each group fi; j; k; lg where fi; jg 2 Gg21 and k; l 2 D2; k 2 R1i nR1j if and
only if l 2 R1jnR1i and k 2 (R1i [ R1j )n(R1i \ R1j ). We denote the set of such groups by Gg42 :
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These groups can not be broken. It is because of the fact that students i and j have two
of their top choices in the group and they can not increase these numbers being in another
group since jR1i \ R1j j  2. On the other hand, k or l has one of their top choices and they
also can not increase these numbers being in another group. For instance, for k, the only
way of increasing this number is being in a group consisting of his partners in the 3-student
group in Gg31 : However, to form a 4-student group, these three students can not nd a fourth
student m who has at least one of his top choices in this group. It is because if m 2 B1, then
these all students must be in Gg22 , but if m 2 Gg22 he has already one of his top choices in
the pair in Gg22 . Therefore, he must have two of his top choices in the 4-student group. But
then, these four students must already be in A1. Now, the set of single students who are not
in a 4-student group is D3 and the set of pairs in G
g2
1 but not used to form the 4-student
groups is Gg210 . Now, depending on jD3j and jGg210 j, there can be three cases:
Case 2.1.2.1 [jD3j = jGg210 j = 0]: We will proceed to the following stage.
Stage 3.1.2.1: This stage is similar to the Stage 2.1.1. Now, however, we form 4-student
groups from the pairs in Gg22 [Gg23 . We denote the set of such groups by Gg43 . Again, by the
same reasonings as in Stage 2.1.1, the 4-student groups can not be broken. Therefore, we
reach the desired matching  = Gg41 [Gg42 [Gg43 .
Case 2.1.2.2 [jGg210 j > jD3j = 0]: We will proceed to the following stage.
Stage 3.1.2.2: This stage is similar to the Stage 2.1.1. Now, however, we form 4-student
groups from the pairs in Gg210 [Gg22 [Gg23 . We denote the set of such groups by Gg43 . Again,
by the same reasonings as in Stage 2.1.1, the 4-student groups can not be broken. Therefore,
we reach the desired matching  = Gg41 [Gg42 [Gg43 .
Case 2.1.2.3 [jD3j > jGg210 j = 0]: We will proceed to the following stage.
Stage 3.1.2.3: In this stage, we randomly form pair of students from the students in
D3. We denote the set of such pairs by G
g2
4 . Then we consider the following stage.
Stage 3.1.2.3: This stage is similar to the Stage 2.1.1. Now, however, we form 4-
student groups from the pairs in Gg22 [Gg23 [Gg24 . We denote the set of such groups by Gg43 .
Again, by the same reasonings as in Stage 2.1.1, the 4-student groups can not be broken.
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Therefore, we reach the desired matching  = Gg41 [Gg42 [Gg43 .
Case 2.2 [jD1j 6= 0]: We should consider the following stage.
Stage 3.2: This stage is similar to the Stage 3.1.2. Now, we form 4-student groups from
the single students in D1 and pair of students in G
g2
1 . We denote the set of such groups by
Gg42 : By the same reasonings as in Stage 3.1.2, the 4-student groups can not be broken. The
set of single students who are not in a 4-student group is now D2 and the set of pairs in G
g2
1
but not used to form the 4-student groups is now Gg22 . Depending on jD2j and jGg22 j, there
can be three cases:
Case 2.2.1 [jD2j = jGg22 j = 0]: This case is identical to the case where jBn1 j = 0. Therefore,
we have a stable matching for this case.
Case 2.2.2 [jD2j > jGg22 j = 0]: This case is identical to the case where jD3j > jGg210 j = 0.
Therefore, we have a stable matching for this case.
Case 2.2.3 [jGg22 j > jD2j = 0]: This case is identical to the case where jD1j = 0. Therefore,
we have a stable matching for this case.
The proof is done since for all the possible cases, we can nd a stable matching. 
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